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INTRODUCTION 
International athletic competitions are some of the most popular events 
in the world and have impacts that can be felt around the world.  
Unfortunately, many events involving international athletic competition 
require legal resolutions.  This paper will detail why nations are so 
competitive in their bids to host events like the Olympic Games and the 
International Federation of Association Football (FIFA) World Cup.  The 
paper will then go on to discuss the structure of the International Olympic 
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Committee (IOC), FIFA, and international sports law, including the 
evolution of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). Finally, the paper 
will detail the corruption scandals that have plagued and continue to plague 
the selection of host cities for the Olympics and FIFA World Cup and 
discuss the power of the CAS and how it is expanding. The current system 
is not sufficient to control International Federations (IFs) and the IOC, and 
it remains to be seen if the necessary action will ever willingly be taken to 
create a system that can provide justice in the world of international 
athletics.  As a result, it is imperative for National Federations and National 
Olympic Committees to work together and take the necessary actions to 
protect the integrity and value of international athletic competitions; these 
organizations cannot blindly rely on their respective International 
Federations.   
I.  IMPORTANCE OF HOSTING INTERNATIONAL ATHLETIC COMPETITIONS 
 Hosting large international sporting events can have a significant impact 
on nations and the pride that comes with international success is difficult to 
match.  One of the most tangible ways to measure the importance of hosting 
these events is the economic impact.  Hosting these events can serve as a 
significant bargaining chip in global politics, making the competition 
amongst bidding countries and cities to host these events intense. 
A.  Economic Importance  
One of the cities that bid to host the 2012 Summer Olympic Games was 
the Washington-Baltimore Metropolitan Area.1  It was estimated that 
hosting the Olympic Games in this area would generate $3.17 billion, 
including $2.15 billion in increased transactions among local businesses 
resulting from increased personal income among local residents.2  The total 
economic impact was estimated to be $5.3 billion and would result in new 
jobs, wage increases, and new tax revenue that would not be created,-- and 
has not been created,-- without hosting the Olympic Games.3   
AECOM,4 a managing and consulting firm, was enlisted to do a similar 
study on the economic impacts that hosting a potential World Cup would 
  
 1. STEPHEN S. FULLER & RICHARD CLINCH, THE ECONOMIC AND FISCAL IMPACTS OF 
HOSTING THE 2012 OLYMPIC GAMES ON THE WASHINGTON-BALTIMORE METROPOLITAN AREA 
2 (2000). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Background information on the AECOM company can be found at About, 
AECOM, http://www.aecom.com/About (last visited Apr. 30, 2012). 
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have on the United States5 and estimated that it would have a $5 billion 
impact on the United States economy.6  The study also estimated there 
would be a creation of between 65,000 and 100,000 new jobs because of the 
preparation and operation needed to host a World Cup tournament.7  
AECOM compared the impact of hosting the World Cup to the equivalent 
of hosting 12 to 18 Super Bowls, with each city receiving an economic 
impact between $400 million and $600 million as well as the creation of 
5,000 to 8,000 jobs during the event.8 
Although it is not a sharp economic jolt that results from hosting the 
Olympic Games, the long term economic impact of hosting the event is 
evident. Park City, Utah is a perfect example of the long term effects.   Over 
the past ten years, overall skiers have increased by 42%9 and the overall 
skiable acreage has increased by 26% in Utah.10  Park City, Utah, for 
example, has seen a 200% increase in international guests, including guests 
from Brazil, Australia, and Mexico.11  It is questionable if Park City was 
even a consideration for visitors prior to the resorts’ exposure during the 
2002 Winter Olympics.12 
The economic benefits of hosting international competitions are not 
universally regarded so highly.  Estimations made while bidding or preparing 
to host an international competition are often inflated and studies rarely 
examine whether the claimed benefits actually materialized.13  Most of these 
projections also fail to take into account what is displaced within the 
economic landscape by the new projected expenditures.14  Although there is 
not an exact science to determine what impact hosting an international 
athletic event would have on an economy, it will affect the economy, even if 
the effects are long-term and not immediately noticeable .15  Furthermore, 
even if the economic benefits are minimal as some economists predict,16 the 
  
 5. AECOM Studies Economic Impact of Hosting FIFA World Cup in US, AECOM 
(Dec. 8, 2009), http://www.aecom.com/What+We+Do/Economics/_news/AECOM+Studies+ 
Economic+Impact+of+Hosting+FIFA+World+Cup+in+US.  
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Lynn DeBruin, Utah Resorts Still Capitalizing on Olympic Success, YAHOO.COM, 
Nov. 14, 2011, http://news.yahoo.com/utah-resorts-still-capitalizing-olympic-success-
184505576.html. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id.  
 12. Id. (citing Park City Chamber and Visitors Bureau President Bill Malone’s 
comments regarding the exposure the Olympic Games provided Park City’s ski resorts). 
 13. Brian Sturgess & Chris Brady, Hosting the FIFA World Cup, 7 WORLD ECON. 
145, 147 (2006). 
 14. Id. at 149. 
 15. Id. at 163.   
 16. See generally Dennis Coates, World Cup Economics: What Americans Need to 
Know About a US World Cup Bid (Univ. of Maryland Baltimore County, Working Paper No. 
10-121), available at http://www.umbc.edu/economics/wpapers/wp_10_121.pdf.  
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perceived potential gain serves as a political advantage for those responsible 
for bringing in these events.  Consequently, the bidding to host these events 
is both competitive and expensive.   
B.  Diplomatic and Political Importance 
In addition to the economic benefits, whether perceived or real, hosting 
international athletic events may increase a nation’s global political 
strength. The role of nationalism in international sports will not disappear 
anytime soon.  Nationalism and political movements were never 
characteristics that were intended to be a part of the Olympic Movement, 
but have made international competition special and have since been 
embraced by the IOC as part of the Olympic Movement.17  Sportsmanship 
and goodwill are no longer the centerpieces of international competition, at 
least as far as sovereign nations are concerned:18  national governments are 
now using these events to exert political pressure for diplomatic or political 
gains.19  
International athletic events have been used to gain both national and 
political recognition, combat human rights problems, foster international 
cooperation, and spread political ideology.20 Unfortunately, national 
governments have abused national pride to advance political agendas. For 
example, the main purpose of international athletic developmental programs 
in the Soviet Union was to ensure that Soviet athletes played a leading role 
internationally and use the success on the playing field to advance the 
communist movement.21 In addition, The Peoples’ Republic of China has 
used international athletics as a means of establishing diplomatic relations 
with other nations.22  
The tipping point of political involvement within international athletic 
events can be seen in the boycotts of the Olympic Games in 1980 and 1984. 
Hosting the 1980 Summer Olympics was extremely important to the 
Soviets, and the Soviet Union saw the selection of Moscow as the host city 
as the IOC’s acceptance of the Soviet Union’s commitment to peace and 
national stability.23 United States President Jimmy Carter was not happy 
about the selection of Moscow as the host city for the 1980 Olympic 
Games, and Carter used the Olympic Games to show his disapproval of the 
  
 17. Barbara O’Neill, International Sports: Have States Succeeded Athletes as the 
Players?, 6 DICK. J. INT’L L. 403, 413 (1988). 
 18. Id. at 405. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 417. 
 21. Id. at 416.  
 22. Id. 
 23. Scott Rosner & Deborah Low, The Efficacy of Olympic Bans and Boycotts on 
Effectuating International Political and Economic Change, 11 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 
27, 46 (2009) 
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Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan.24 Four years later, the 1984 
Olympics were held in Los Angeles.25 Consequently, the Soviet Union 
accused the United States organizers of being anti-Soviet and boycotted the 
games.26 Although the Soviet Union claimed that its boycott of the Los 
Angeles games was due to security concerns, it was clear there was a 
political motive behind the action.27  
II.  INTERNATIONAL SPORTS LAW  
There are many reasons why nations desire to host large international 
sporting events. Pride and intense competition are two aspects that make 
athletics both entertaining and memorable experiences. The competition, 
however, extends far beyond the playing fields. Unfortunately, even in the 
arena of international athletic competition, participants still end up in legal 
disputes. International sports law cannot be easily defined by a set of rules, 
but it can instead be defined as a set of principles, institutions, and 
procedures that are exercised while partaking in international athletic 
activities.28 The law governing these activities is consequently drawn from 
international agreements, customs, generally accepted practices, and judicial 
decisions.29 These influences have been codified in the Olympic Charter, 
which now serves as the foundation for international sports law.30 Because 
soccer is currently an Olympic sport, both FIFA and its member federations 
are bound by the provisions of the Olympic Charter.  
A.   Olympic Movement 
At the heart of the Olympic Charter is the Olympic Movement, which 
aims “to contribute to building a peaceful and better world by educating 
youth through sport practised in accordance with Olympism and its 
values.”31 Although the Olympic Charter does not serve as the ultimate 
source of international sports law, it does provide a solid foundation by 
serving as a nucleus for the development of international sports law and sets 
a foundation for managing the legal process.32 There are three main 
constituents of the Olympic Movement: the IOC, IFs, and National Olympic 
Committees.33  
  
 24. Id. at 47. 
 25. Id. at 53. 
 26. Id. at 55.  
 27. Id.   
 28. JAMES A.R. NAFZIGER, INTERNATIONAL SPORTS LAW 1 (2d ed. 2004). 
 29. Id. at 1-2. 
 30. Id. at 2. 
 31. OLYMPIC CHARTER, Rule 1(2). 
 32. NAFZIGER, supra note 28, at 3.   
 33. OLYMPIC CHARTER, Rule 1(2).  
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1.    Structure of the IOC 
The IOC is the ultimate decision-maker under the Olympic Charter, and 
claims authority over any “organisation belonging in any capacity 
whatsoever to the Olympic Movement.”34 The IOC has taken proactive 
steps toward ensuring the Olympic process is one free of corruption and 
unethical influence. The IOC is officially a non-governmental not-for-profit 
organization that consists of up to 115 members.35 The IOC Executive 
Board resolves disputes relating to the IOC’s application of the Olympic 
Charter or Code of Ethics.36 The IOC’s Executive Board is made up of a 
president, four vice-presidents, and ten other members.37 Members of the 
IOC Executive Board are elected through a secret ballot election by the 
Session38 and are responsible for overseeing the Olympic Charter and 
producing legally binding codes, rulings, norms, guidelines, guides, 
manuals, instructions, requirements and other decisions including, but not 
limited to all regulations necessary to ensure proper implementation of the 
Olympic Charter and proper organization of the Olympic Games.”39   
The Ethics Commission is one of the most important entities created by 
the IOC and aims to retain the integrity of the IOC and Olympic Movement, 
but the commission only has jurisdiction over matters referred by the IOC 
President.40 Although this provision gives the IOC President a potentially 
dangerous amount of discretion over the Ethics Commissions authority, the 
circumstances leading up to its creation should not be overlooked.41 The 
IOC Ethics Commission is independent of the IOC and cannot consist of 
more than four IOC members and must have at least five members that are 
not members of the IOC.42 Members of the commission are appointed by the 
IOC President and confirmed by the Executive Committee.43 Once again, 
the IOC allows its president a substantial amount of authority, but when it 
comes to establishing the Ethics Commission, there is a check on the 
President’s authority.  
  
 34. Id. at Rule 1(4). 
 35. Id. at Rules 15(1), 16(1). 
 36. Id. at Rule 19.  
 37. Id.   
 38. The Session is the general collection of IOC members. 
 39. OLYMPIC CHARTER, Rule 19(3.1). 
 40. INT’L OLYMPIC COMMITTEE, CODE OF ETHICS AND OTHER TEXTS 83-87 (2009), 
available at http://www.olympic.org/Documents/Reports/EN/Code-Ethique-2009-WebEN.pdf 
 [hereinafter IOC CODE OF ETHICS]. 
 41. See id. 
 42. Id. at 133-35. 
 43. Id. 
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2.  Olympic and IF Sovereignty 
International sports organizations enjoy freedom to regulate themselves 
and promulgate their own rules by setting up their own bylaws and 
disciplinary procedures. These organizations are created under the arm of 
private law, and they have placed the legislative, executive, and judicial 
powers on themselves.44 IFs have even been able to punish members for 
merely challenging decisions of the IF in a court of law.45 National courts, 
however, still interject their opinions, which has led to a change in 
philosophy by the IOC and IFs.46  
When dealing with these organizations, it can be nearly impossible to 
coordinate the national justice system with IFs and the IOC. This was 
depicted throughout the litigation process of Reynolds v. IAAF and 
surrounding events. Butch Reynolds47 was an American track and field star 
who attempted to resolve his issues with the International Amateur Athletic 
Federation (IAAF) through United States Federal Court, but the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled that international sports 
federations must have sufficient minimum contacts with a forum state to 
have jurisdiction, and merely governing athletes located within that state 
does not constitute sufficient contacts.48  
However, the Sixth Circuit improperly interjected its opinion on 
jurisdiction in the case of Butch Reynolds. The Reynolds case had been 
previously arbitrated per the rules governing the IAAF and The Athletic 
Congress.49 The United States is a party to the United Nations Convention 
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.50 Because 
the U.S. is a party to this treaty, it is binding on the Sixth Circuit,51 and the 
fact that this case had been previously arbitrated should have been the 
deciding factor, not the Sixth Circuit’s opinion on whether there was proper 
jurisdiction. But the Sixth Circuit felt it was necessary to take a much more 
controversial route than was necessary to reach its conclusion.  
  
 44. Andrea Pinna, The Trials and Tribulations of the Court of Arbitration for Sport. 
Contribution to the Study of the Arbitration of Disputes Concerning Disciplinary Sanctions, 
in THE COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT 1984-2004 386, 389 (Ian S. Blackshaw, Robert 
C.R. Siekmann & Janwillem Soek eds., 2006). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 390.   
 47. USATF Athlete Biography: Butch Reynolds, USATF.COM, 
http://www.usatf.org/athletes/bios/TrackAndFieldArchive/2000/reynolds.html (last visited 
Feb. 23, 2012). 
 48. See generally Reynolds v. IAAF, 23 F.3d 1110 (6th Cir. 1994). 
 49. NAFZIGER, supra note 28, at 75. 
 50. Id. at 78. 
 51. Id.   
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B.  Structure of FIFA 
 FIFA is the international governing body for the sport of soccer. The 
federation is controlled by the Executive Committee which is supposed to 
abide by the standards set forth in the FIFA Code of Ethics and is bound by 
the Olympic Charter. However, it is Committee members’ alleged 
misconduct that has given rise to questions surrounding the ability of 
international sports law to prevent corruption in international sports 
organizations.  
1.  Executive Committee  
The FIFA World Cup’s location is chosen by the FIFA’s Executive 
Committee, which is made up of 24 members: one President elected by the 
congress, eight Vice Presidents, and fifteen members appointed by the 
world’s soccer Confederations and Associations.52 The design of the 
committee makes it impossible for a single geographic region to dominate 
the Executive Committee,53 and consequently, in order for a country’s bid to 
be selected to host the World Cup, requires some sort of majority amongst 
FIFA’s global representatives.  
2.  FIFA Code of Ethics 
FIFA also has a code of ethics, and FIFA’s Executive Committee 
approved the creation of an independent Ethics Committee.54 The FIFA 
Code of Ethics directly addresses the giving and accepting of gifts as well as 
bribery of its members.55 There is not a blanket ban on the acceptance of 
gifts or other benefits from hosts,56 but these gifts must be in accordance 
with cultural norms and customs.57 However, if there is any doubt as to 
whether gifts are not in compliance with the FIFA Code of Ethics, then the 
gifts must be declined.58 Further, cash is never an appropriate gift for a 
FIFA official to accept.59 FIFA officials must always err on the side of 
caution when the exchanging of gifts is involved. However, even with a gift 
  
 52. FIFA STATUTES, Rule 30(1) (2011), available at 
http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/generic/01/48/60/05/fifastatuten2011_e.pdf. 
 53. Id.   
 54. FIFA CODE OF ETHICS (2009), available at 
http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/administration/50/02/82/efsdcodeofethics_ 
web.pdf. 
 55. Id. at Rules 10, 11. 
 56. Id. at Rule 10. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
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exchanging provision, the FIFA Code of Ethics contains a strict prohibition 
on bribery.60  
The FIFA Code of Ethics also addresses the Ethics Committee’s 
jurisdiction, means of redress, and other responsibilities. The FIFA Code of 
Ethics expressly gives the Ethics Committee the authority to judge all cases 
that fall under the jurisdiction of FIFA, which include those relating to the 
conduct of FIFA officials, confederation officials, and associations.61 FIFA 
also has jurisdiction over national cases that local governing bodies fail to 
prosecute appropriately.62 The discipline for any violations of the FIFA 
Code of Ethics is derived from the FIFA Statutes and the FIFA Disciplinary 
Code.63 Any decision that is made by the Ethics Committee may be 
appealed to the Appeal Committee unless the sanction handed down was a 
warning, reprimand, suspension of less than three matches or of up to two 
months, or a fine of less than CHF 7,500.64 Appeals Committee decisions 
are final but are subject to appeals with the CAS.65  
C.  Subjecting FIFA to the Rules of the IOC 
The Olympic Charter places the burden on IFs to ensure the values that 
are stated in the Olympic Charter are embodied within each individual 
federation.66 Consequently, the IOC has a vested interest in its investigation 
of FIFA. However, the greater question is if FIFA truly cares about the IOC 
or its own duties to the Olympic Charter. The Olympic Charter seems to 
suggest that the IOC has the authority to impose its standards on FIFA, who 
must also submit voluntarily to the IOC’s implied authority. FIFA, however, 
has a larger bargaining chip than other IFs, and appears to be using it to its 
advantage.  
1.  The Olympic Advantage  
Traditionally, IFs use the Olympics as a method to provide a tremendous 
boost for the profiles of their respective sports. This is evidenced by the 
actions taken by the Federation Internationale de Basketball and the 
International Ice Hockey Federation.67 After National Basketball 
  
 60. FIFA CODE OF ETHICS (2009), Rule 11. 
 61. Id. at Rule 15.  
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at Rule 17. 
 64. Id. at Rule 18. CHF 7,500 is approximately equal to $8, 266 in United States 
currency.  
 65. Id. 
 66. OLYMPIC CHARTER, Rule 27. 
 67. Federation Rule Change Opens Olympics to N.B.A. Players, N.Y. TIMES, April 8, 
1989, http://www.nytimes.com/1989/04/08/sports/federation-rule-change-opens-olympics-to-
nba-players.html; Joe LaPointe, The N.H.L.’s Olympic Gamble; Stars’ Participation in 
Nagano Could Raise Sport’s Profile, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1997, 
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Association (NBA) players were allowed to play in the Olympics, the 
NBA’s global awareness grew substantially because of the Dream Team’s68 
performance in the 1992 Summer Olympics in Barcelona.69 Prior to the 
1998 Winter Olympics in Nagano, National Hockey League (NHL) players 
were not able to participate in the Olympic Games, but the NHL’s 
commissioner, Gary Bettman, was aware of the boom the NBA experienced 
by participating in the Olympic games and wanted to follow the NBA 
model for gathering more exposure.70  In prior Winter Olympics, hockey 
tournament participation was limited to any player that had not played in the 
NHL.71  
Baseball, by contrast, is a sport that has recently lost its Olympic status.72 
Baseball has a characteristic different than basketball and hockey: 
Europeans simply do not have interest in the sport and the majority of 
influence on the IOC is still European.73 Further, In addition to the inability 
of the IOC to secure the participation of Major League Baseball (MLB) 
players for the Olympic baseball tournament, the tournament is formatted in 
a manner that prevents high levels of play because the competition is 
limited by providing automatic qualification to regions or countries that 
have little or no tradition in the sport.74 For example, China started a 
baseball program solely because they were given an automatic bid in the 
2008 Summer Olympics for being the host nation.75 The exclusion of MLB 
players may have been insulting to the IOC. Olympic historian David 
Wallechinsky believes that the IOC was upset with MLB which resulted in 
the exclusion of baseball from future Olympic Games.76  
2.  FIFA’s Olympic Immunity 
The Olympic soccer tournament is limited to mostly younger players still 
trying to establish themselves. National teams may only use players under 
the age of 23, with the exception of three spots available for veterans that 
  
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/09/16/sports/hockey-nhl-s-olympic-gamble-stars-
participation-nagano-could-raise-sport-s.html. 
 68. The Original Dream Team, NBA ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.nba.com/history/ 
dreamT_moments.html (last visited April 22, 2012). 
 69. LaPointe, supra note 67. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Mark Zuckerman, On Baseball: No Crying Over Olympic Baseball, WASH. 
TIMES, Aug. 12, 2008, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/aug/12/no-use-crying-
over-olympic-baseballs-end. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Strike 3 for Olympic Baseball, CBSNEWS.COM (Feb. 11, 2009), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/02/09/sportsline/main1300205.shtml. 
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exceed the age limit.77 Although players that meet this qualification 
frequently have tremendous talent, the Olympic competition is more of a 
young stars competition than a true competition between the elite athletes of 
the game.78 If the Olympic soccer tournament was to start tomorrow, there 
is the potential it would have to do so without superstars such as Wayne 
Rooney,79 Landon Donovan,80 Didier Drogba,81 and Lionel Messi.82 Further, 
none of the players that were members of the United States’ 2010 World 
Cup team will be eligible for the 2012 Olympic Games in London.83 
Although three of these players could be added to the roster as one of the 
exempted players, the national teams are still left with an unproven roster. 
Consequently, fans are left to see an Olympic soccer tournament without the 
best players from each country.  
FIFA’s disregard for the Olympics is based purely on the way the 
Olympic soccer tournament is classified by FIFA. In the days leading up to 
the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing, three European soccer clubs won 
the right to prevent their players from playing in the Olympic tournament.84 
The CAS took a position in favor of the European clubs because FIFA did 
not include the Olympic tournament on its official match calendar.85 
Although the decision did not affect the eligibility of the players for the 
Olympic tournament,86 it does show that FIFA did not consider the Olympic 
tournament a priority. There does appear to be some accountability being 
demonstrated as the Olympics have been included on the match calendar for 
2012.87  
  
 77. Sam Stern, Olympic Soccer Limits Age, Not Talent, N.Y. SUN (Aug. 5, 2008), 
http://www.nysun.com/sports/olympic-soccer-limits-age-not-talent/83209/ 
 78. Id. 
 79. Wayne Rooney, ESPN.COM, http://soccernet.espn.go.com/player/_/id/21046/ 
Wayne-Rooney?cc=5901 (last visited Apr. 22, 2012). 
 80. Landon Donovan, ESPN.COM, http://soccernet.espn.go.com/player/_/id/19107/ 
landon-donovan?cc=5901 (last visited Apr. 22, 2012). 
 81. Didier Drogba, ESPN.COM, http://soccernet.espn.go.com/player/_/id/18727? 
cc=5901 (last visited Apr. 22, 2012). 
 82. Lionel Messi, ESPN.COM http://soccernet.espn.go.com/player/_/id/45843/lionel-
messi?cc=5901 (last visited Apr. 22, 2012). 
 83. 2010 FIFA World Cup Roster, USSOCCER.COM, http://www.ussoccer.com/ 
Tournaments/FIFA-World-Cup/2010-FIFA-World-Cup/Training-Camp-Roster/100526-
Roster.aspx (last visited Apr. 22, 2012). 
 84. Stephen Wade, European Soccer Clubs Win Appeal, USA TODAY, Aug. 8, 2008, 
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/olympics/2008-08-06-3240442092_x.htm.  
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Calendar, FIFA.COM, http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/calendar/events.html (last 
visited Apr. 29, 2012).  
808 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 20:3  
D.  Court of Arbitration Sport 
In addition to the IOC and IF regulation of international sports, the Court 
of Arbitration Sport (CAS) is in place to handle international sports disputes 
through arbitration. The CAS serves as the appellate court for international 
sports disputes. Every year the number of disputes seems to be growing 
exponentially, and the CAS has been continuously evolving through an 
expansion process since its creation.88  
1.  Infancy of the CAS 
The CAS was established in 1983 by the IOC and began work in June of 
1984.89 The first IF to accept the CAS as a supreme arbitrator was the 
International Equestrian Federation.90 But when the independence of the 
CAS was challenged, the Swiss Federal Tribunal held that the CAS was 
independent from IFs.91  
At the inception of the CAS, the IOC had at least the appearance of 
substantial authority over the CAS. First, the IOC was originally responsible 
for the costs of the CAS.92 Also, the combination of the IOC and its 
President had the authority to appoint 30 of the 60 members of the CAS.93 
The combination of these authorities was enough for the Swiss Federal 
Tribunal to declare that the CAS was not independent from the reach of the 
IOC.94 The lack of complete independence from the IOC showed the 
necessity for a change in the structure of the CAS.95  
2.  Reform of the CAS and the Paris Agreement 
The International Conference of Law and Sport was held in 1993 to 
present proposed changes to the CAS.96 The most notable change made 
during this conference was the creation of the International Council of 
Arbitration for Sport (ICAS).97 The ICAS then replaced the IOC as the party 
responsible for overseeing and financing the CAS.98 The CAS was 
  
 88. James A.R. Nafziger, Globalizing Sports Law, 9 MARQ. SPORTS L. J. 225, 232 
(1999). 
 89. Mattieu Reeb, The Role and Functions of the Court of Arbitration for Sport 
(CAS), in THE COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT 1984-2004 31, 32 (Ian S. Blackshaw, 
Robert C.R. Siekmann, & Janwillem Soek eds., 2006). 
 90. Id. at 33.  
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 32-33. 
 93. Id.  
 94. Id. at 33-34. 
 95. Reeb, supra note 89, at 33.  
 96. Id. at 34.  
 97. Id. 
 98. Id.  
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consequently set up into an ordinary arbitration division and appeals 
arbitration division,99 which changes can be seen in the Code of Sports-
related Arbitration.100 
The proposed changes that were made at the International Conference of 
Law and Sport were agreed to in Paris on June 22, 1994.101 This agreement 
was signed by the “highest authorities” of the international sporting world: 
the IOC, Association of Summer Olympic International Federations 
(ASOIF), Association of International Winter Sports Federations (AIWF), 
and the Association of National Olympic Committees (ANOC).102 Although 
all arbitration is governed by the Swiss Federal Act on Private International 
Law, the CAS has increased its physical presence around the globe by 
opening offices in the United States and Australia.103 Since this agreement, 
the Swiss Federal Tribunal has not ruled in favor of any appeal that is based 
upon the principle of the CAS’s independence from a sports governing 
body.104  
3.  Current State of the CAS 
The CAS got off to a slow start after its creation, but has since picked up 
steam.105 It was not until the early part of the 2000s that FIFA and the 
International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) decided to make 
the CAS part of their organizational structure.106 Now that FIFA and the 
IAAF have accepted the CAS as their appellate court, these organizations 
make up 30-40% of the caseload for the CAS.107 The decisions by FIFA and 
the IAAF seem to have played a large part in the expansion of the CAS and 
were among major reasons the CAS has evolved into a legitimate 
international legal entity. Another factor that has drastically increased the 
caseload of the CAS is that it was chosen as the arbitrator responsible for 
resolving disputes arising out of the World Anti-Doping Code (WADC).108 
The CAS has experienced an increase in responsibility as the sporting world 
looks to it for leadership, and it is apparent that the global community has 
accepted the abilities of the CAS. Today the CAS averages between 250 and 
300 cases every year.109  
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It seems that the majority of cases that come before the CAS involve 
doping or drug use110 and a governing body imposing a punishment on an 
individual. This makes the comments of IOC President Jacques Rogge even 
more interesting; Rogge stated, “‘In terms of the champions, there is always 
the threat of doping. In terms of management of sport, there is the threat of 
unethical practices.’”111 This implies that, at least as far as the IOC is 
concerned, the CAS was intended to have the authority to review corruption 
charges based upon the decisions of IFs and the IOC. Because of the 
relationship of the IOC and IFs, this should include all IFs that participate in 
the Olympics. However, Rogge’s statement does not go so far as to allow 
national bodies to challenge IFs or the IOC.  
4.  Overview of CAS Procedures 
In order for a case to even reach the CAS, the appellant must have 
exhausted all possible action within the appropriate governing body.112 
However, once a case makes it before the CAS, the CAS has substantial 
freedom in handling the dispute. According to the CAS code, the CAS panel 
is required to review the facts and legal consequences while making its 
decision.113  
The appeals process consists of two stages: 1) a statement of appeal must 
be submitted to the CAS; and 2) the appellant must substantiate the appeal 
in an appellate brief to the CAS.114 The appellee, coincidentally, responds to 
the appeal in two parts. First, the respondent must appoint an arbitrator if 
one has not been previously agreed to within ten days of receipt of the 
appellant’s petition.115 If the appellee fails to appoint an arbitrator, the 
President of the appropriate CAS division shall make the appointment.116 
Second, the appellee must submit and answer any defense regarding lack of 
jurisdiction and any potential counterclaim within twenty days of the receipt 
of the appeal,117 as well as specify evidence, witnesses, and experts.118 
The arbitration panel has three options when hearing an appeal: uphold 
the decision, replace the decision with its own, or vacate the decision and 
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remand the case to a lower authority.119 The option to remand the case to a 
lower authority is seldom used because of the lack of efficiency and high 
costs associated with the process.120 The decision of the CASis binding on 
the participating parties.121 In appropriate cases, the CAS may take 
provisional action.122  
5.  Strength of the CAS 
The idea of an independent international tribunal like the CAS is ideal 
for parties in the international community. Unfortunately, these tribunals are 
only as enforceable as the participating parties are willing to accept. 
Consequently, CAS decisions are only enforceable in nations that have 
signed the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards.123  Every nation that bid for the 2018 and 2022 
World Cups, however, was a party to this agreement.124 Thus, any decision 
that may be handed down by the CAS would be binding on all of the 
participating nations in the bid process for the 2018 and 2022 World Cups.  
Awards that are given pursuant to the CAS may only be challenged 
before the Swiss Federal Tribunal.125 But even those challenges are limited 
to challenges on incorrect constitution of the arbitral tribunal, lack of 
jurisdiction, violation of the principle of equal treatment, or incompatibility 
with public policy.126 
6.  Why a CAS? 
There is no flawless plan for an international tribunal. The perfection of 
our own system in the United States can be heavily debated, but there are 
certain advantages to the CAS that cannot be ignored. One of the 
advantages of CAS is the confidentiality the process provides.127 CAS 
proceedings are private, have no public record, and happen without the 
media being informed about the proceedings.128 This may be helpful to 
maintain the public perception of athletes and athletic organizations that are 
wrongfully charged. This can be extremely important for athletes because of 
the public perception that being a cheater creates and the mentality that has 
formed amongst the masses that athletes are guilty of cheating until they are 
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able to prove they are innocent.129 The interest and amount of litigation in 
sports worldwide has become so great that the mass publication of remote 
cases may cause the loss of interest or faith by the public. However, there 
are instances where the public interest may outweigh the CAS’s obligation 
of confidentiality.130 The CAS is also designed to be a quick process and 
allows flexibility of its procedures in order to maximize its practicality.131 
One of the main goals of the CAS is to provide low cost service to the 
parties without incurring excessive costs.132 The creation of the CAS 
appears to have the interest of fairness being exemplified in sports 
regardless of a party’s financial assets.  
III.  CORRUPTION INVOLVED IN HOSTING THE OLYMPICS AND THE WORLD 
CUP 
Becoming the host for the Olympics is an extremely elaborate process.133 
Hosting international competitions such as the Olympic Games and the 
World Cup is left up to committee elections,134 and the competition for 
selection between host candidates is a high stakes competition. Chicago 
spent an estimated $100 million on its Olympic bid and finished fourth out 
of four in the final vote for the 2016 Olympic Games, losing to Rio de 
Janeiro, Madrid, and Tokyo.135 This is not the type of money that host 
candidates are looking to spend without a belief that they are going to be 
selected to host the event. Because of this intense competition, corruption 
has been a widespread problem in both the Olympics and World Cup.136 
There have been a few memorable recent controversies involving the 
selection of hosts for these prestigious events, including the 2002 Winter 
Olympics in Salt Lake City, Utah and the most recent World Cup selections 
of Russia and Qatar.  
A.  Salt Lake City 
Salt Lake City, Utah was awarded the 2002 Winter Olympic Games in 
1995, and three years later a corruption scandal broke in relation to the 
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city’s obtaining of the games.137 Allegations surfaced that members of the 
Salt Lake City Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games had given 
IOC members goods, services, contracts, educational benefits, employment 
of relatives, and as much as $1.2 million in payments to agents of IOC 
membership blocs.138 One example of kickbacks given to a voter was Jean-
Claude Ganga from the Congo Republic: Ganga benefited greatly from the 
Salt Lake City corruption by receiving $300,000 cash, medical treatment, 
travel expenses, doorknobs, and knee replacement surgery for his mother-
in-law.139 Ganga was ultimately forced to resign his from his position with 
the IOC.140 
The election of Salt Lake City to host the 2002 Winter Olympic Games 
is not the only instance of irregularities in host city elections.141 
Irregularities were evident in the selections of Atlanta, Nagano, and 
Sydney.142 Sydney paid IOC members $35,000 apiece to ensure its two vote 
victory over Beijing to host the 2000 Summer Olympic Games.143  
The success and popularity of the 2002 Winter Olympics is enough to 
demonstrate how the Salt Lake City Olympic scandal ended: The games 
stayed in Salt Lake. In fact, the investigation into the allegations revealed a 
complete disregard for the bidding process and the rules governing it for 
several previous Olympic Games.144 The organizers of the Salt Lake bid 
were frustrated by other cities cheating and decided to “play the game.”145  
B.  Olympic Response and Current Standards 
These scandals ultimately prompted amendments to the Olympic Charter 
regarding the Olympic site-selection process, as the IOC adopted a Code of 
Ethics and formed an Ethics Commission to address issues of 
impropriety.146 Rule 22 of the Olympic Charter creates the authority of the 
IOC’s Ethics Commission.147 The Ethical Standards of the IOC are outlined 
in the IOC Code of Ethics. The preamble of the IOC Code of Ethics states: 
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The International Olympic Committee and each of its members, the cities 
wishing to organise the Olympic Games, the Organising Committees of 
the Olympic Games and the National Olympic Committees (“the Olympic 
parties”) restate their commitment to the Olympic Charter and in particular 
its Fundamental Principles. The Olympic parties affirm their loyalty to the 
Olympic ideal inspired by Pierre de Coubertin.  
Consequently, at all times the Olympic parties and, in the framework of 
the Olympic Games, the participants, undertake to respect and ensure 
respect of the present Code and the following principles: Dignity . . . 
Integrity . . . Resources . . . Candidatures . . . Relations with States . . . 
Confidentiality . . . Implementation.148 
All of the IOC’s members are required to behave in a manner that is in 
accordance with the ethical standards of the IOC.149 In addition to those 
standards, the IOC Code of Ethics also outlines the steps that the IOC Ethics 
Commission must take while investigating potential or alleged 
wrongdoing.150 This structure was to lay the foundation for the Olympic 
Movement to maintain its integrity.  
The IOC’s response to the Salt Lake City Scandal may not have been 
enough to deter participants from engaging in unethical behavior. The IOC 
seems to be committed to maintaining a system of protectionism,151 which 
can be seen in the events following the tragic death of a Georgian luger at 
the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver.152 On the opening day of the 
Vancouver Games, a Georgian luger died while on a training run.153 
Following an investigation by the International Luge Federation (FIL), the 
FIL found that there were several interrelated events that had caused the 
tragedy, emphasizing driver error.154 The FIL declined to make 
recommendations to the IOC to increase safety and the IOC declined to 
admit a mistake had been made by leaving exposed metal poles next to the 
track immediately after one of the fastest and most dangerous curves in luge 
history.155 Instead, the IOC stuck to a policy of denial that protects the 
relationships of the IOC and IFs.156 
From a business aspect, the IOC enjoys the freedoms provided by Swiss 
business laws, which are ineffective at governing the IOC as a 
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corporation.157 There are proposed reforms that may ultimately hold the IOC 
and IFs responsible for their business actions.158 Until the reforms are 
passed, however, it will be nearly impossible to regulate these 
organizations.159  
C.  Is History Repeating Itself? 
The Olympic Games are by no means the only events subject to 
corruption. There are also questions surrounding the selection of the 2018 
and 2022 World Cup host nations. FIFA and the IOC are not the same 
organization; however, there is a significant relationship between 
international federations and the International Olympic Committee.160 
Fortunately for FIFA, of the International Federations they are the least 
handicapped by the IOC’s power.161 Most International Federations are 
dependent on the IOC for the promotion of their sports,162 but FIFA’s World 
Cup is just as big as, if not bigger than, the Olympics.   
The IOC announced they are going to investigate claims of corruption in 
FIFA.163 However, the authority to investigate FIFA is only created by the 
relationships between IFs and the IOC. Although the IOC does not have any 
formal authority over FIFA in particular, there is some the IOC may exert 
over individual members and participating federations.164 Because the IOC 
does maintain the ability to supervise its members, it may exert an 
investigation into their actions.165 In this instance, FIFA’s Executive 
Committee President, Joseph S. Blatter (Sepp Blatter) is a member of the 
IOC,166 as well as one of the Vice Presidents of FIFA’s Executive 
Committee, Issa Hayatou are members of both FIFA’s executive committee 
and the IOC.167 
Accusations of corruption within FIFA have since been made during a 
British parliamentary inquiry.168 David Triesman, the former leader of 
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England’s bid for the 2018 FIFA World Cup, told British lawmakers that 
four well-established FIFA officials had requested bribes to secure their 
votes for the host country selection.169 In addition to that incident, British 
lawmakers were also informed via The Sunday Times that two FIFA 
officials, Issa Hayatou and Jacques Anouma, were paid $1.5 million for 
their support of the Qatar bid to host the 2022 FIFA World Cup.170 These 
two members of FIFA’s Executive Committee were ultimately barred from 
the selection votes of the 2018 and 2022 FIFA World Cups.171 FIFA’s 
secretary general, Jerome Valcke, has since requested all documented 
evidence from the accusing parties,172 and it is up to Valcke to request the 
FIFA ethics court open an official investigation into these allegations.173 It is 
still not clear whether FIFA will conduct a formal investigation.174 
Andrew Jennings is an investigative reporter that has been investigating 
FIFA for several years and gave a special report on corruption within FIFA 
on the British Broadcasting Company’s (BBC) program Panorama.175 In 
addition to outlining recent corruption scandals in FIFA, Jennings suggests 
that the leadership within FIFA does not care about corruption so long as 
the exchange of money is kept private.176 The program also suggested that 
FIFA’s Ethics Committee does not take allegations against FIFA’s senior 
members seriously.177 It is almost as if FIFA’s Ethics Committee was 
implemented to create the illusion that FIFA is concerned about the integrity 
of its organization. Further, FIFA President Sepp Blatter stated in regard to 
ethics investigations that evidence should be “knowledgeable to us, by 
official means, or by official channels, [and] then naturally we would have a 
look on that.”178 FIFA is apparently unwilling to conduct its own 
investigations of its officials: FIFA will only take action if another 
organization that FIFA deems credible exhausts its resources to uncover the 
misdeeds of FIFA’s members. It is unfortunate that national federations do 
not have the ability to stand up to FIFA and are forced to work within the 
questionable system that has been created.179 It is not difficult to see why 
Salt Lake City felt compelled to join the bribery game in order to win its bid 
to host the 2002 Winter Olympics.  
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It appears that, in order to host the FIFA World Cup, national 
governments were required to submit to FIFA’s demands. These demands, 
to FIFA’s displeasure, were published by the Dutch and consisted of the 
suspension of visa rules, the suspension of workers rights, tax exemptions, 
the creation of new laws to protect FIFA’s official sponsors, and a special 
set of rules for FIFA’s access to the host country’s legal system.180 FIFA’s 
demands are harsh. When the Dutch attempted to stand up to FIFA, FIFA 
responded with a strong letter stating they were putting their bid to host the 
FIFA World Cup at risk.181  
One of the biggest examples of FIFA’s questionable practices is 
Guarantee No. 3, which allows FIFA to operate within the host country 
without having to pay any taxes, and forbids the host country from passing 
any laws that levy taxes on FIFA or its subsidiaries.182 This is a very 
detailed scheme that FIFA uses in order to maximize profit, even though 
FIFA claims to be and operate as a not for profit organization.183 These 
demands leave us to wonder which national governments can even adhere to 
these demands, assuming, arguendo, that governments would even want to. 
FIFA is also secretive about the demands it makes. A senior member of the 
United Kingdom’s Parliament requested to see to what the nation would be 
agreeing, but he was told that the guarantees were confidential184—
apparently so confidential that the people responsible for the guarantees 
were not privileged enough to see them. Democratic nations would have a 
difficult time making these guarantees because of the secrecy FIFA 
requires. Observers of FIFA’s requirements are left to wonder what the 
bigger purpose is behind secretive demands and if these demands are 
designed to make it easier for some countries to have more attractive bids 
than others.185  
It would be easy for analysts to shrug off accusations of corruption 
during the selection processes of the 2018 and 2022 World Cups by 
countries who had losing bids. However, there have already been several 
instances where FIFA officials have been suspended because their 
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involvement in bribery and corruption was caught by the media.186 For 
example, FIFA official Amadou Diakite was suspended for two years 
because he allegedly told reporters posing as bid lobbyists that Qatar bid 
officials had offered $1 million to FIFA leaders from Africa.187 Also, 
Nigeria’s Amos Adamu was suspended for three years for soliciting 
bribes,188 and Togo’s Ahongalu Fusimalohi was suspended two years for 
advising the media how to bribe FIFA officials.189 The multiple instances of 
caught corruption should lead a reasonable person to believe there may be 
more, they just have yet to be caught. 
IV.  ELIMINATING THE PROBLEM 
The lack of authority demonstrated in Reynolds of a national court 
system to resolve disputes involving the IOC and IFs puts people subjected 
to the IOC’s and IFs’ internal rules in a precarious position because there is 
limited recourse for people to make claims against them.190 Also, depending 
on which national governments have allowed themselves to have 
jurisdiction over the IOC or IFs could create a hostile and unnecessary game 
of international politics. It is also unrealistic to expect the IOC or an IF to 
criticize itself and create remedies to correct its own wrongdoing.191 
Consequently, the IOC and IFs are left to exert minimally-checked authority 
over people within the IOC and IFs’ respective sports.  
Although the power reserved by the IOC and IFs has minimal oversight, 
these international sports governing bodies no longer consider themselves to 
be completely immune to national judicial systems and no longer expressly 
prohibit appeals to national courts, accepting, in theory, the competence of 
national court systems.192 However, the IOC and IFs that confer judicial 
power on themselves have taken the approach of using independent 
arbitration.193 By conferring this authority to independent arbitration bodies, 
international sports governing bodies have been able, for practical purposes, 
to eliminate the opinions of national courts to resolve disputes revolving 
around international athletic competition.194  
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The CAS has recently become involved in the corruption scandal that is 
surrounding FIFA. Three suspensions of FIFA officials are currently being 
appealed,195 but CAS has not yet set a date to hear any of these appeals.196 In 
addition to the action pending before the CAS, FIFA president Sepp Blatter 
has expressed his interest in making FIFA as legitimate a governing body as 
possible. Blatter has instituted the idea of zero-tolerance for corruption as a 
platform for his reelection as president of soccer’s governing body.197 
Although no action has yet been taken with respect to England’s allegations 
regarding the 2018 FIFA World Cup, it is now apparent that FIFA will at 
least talk to the whistleblower about the allegations of buying votes for 
Qatar’s bid for the 2022 FIFA World Cup.198 Blatter would not specify what 
actions would be taken, but suggested that the Executive Committee-
controlled Ethics Commission could be invoked and even left open the 
chance of reopening the election of a host nation for the 2022 FIFA World 
Cup.199 However, in light of the previous leadership provided by Sepp 
Blatter, it is not clear how genuine this policy is. The policy cannot and 
should not be viewed as anything more than a campaign promise during 
Blatter’s campaign to be reelected FIFA’s president.  
Since its creation, the CAS is gradually assuming a more prominent role 
in resolving international sports disputes. National federations have even 
begun to use the CAS as their highest level of appeal in lieu of their own 
national judicial system.200 The important thing now is for the CAS to 
continue to grow. It may be necessary for the CAS to take on some 
prosecutorial duties, but the CAS, like the ethics commissions of IFs, relies 
on the IOC and IFs for its authority201 and will unlikely be given the 
authority to tackle improper actions by IOC and IF officials. However, IF 
officials may be susceptible to CAS action if action is first taken by the 
IOC.  
There is now a similar situation to what happened surrounding the 2002 
Winter Olympic Games in Salt Lake City. In the situation currently 
evolving between the IOC and FIFA, there is no incentive for FIFA to 
legitimately concern itself with the IOC’s investigation. FIFA has 
demonstrated that the Olympics and the IOC are not its principal concerns. 
FIFA shows complete disregard for how international law has developed or 
the structure of the IF and IOC relationship. The economic viability of FIFA 
is not dependent on the IOC like the majority of IFs are, and this allows 
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FIFA to act as an independent body equal to that of the IOC. If the CAS was 
able to assume a prosecutorial role with the backing of the international 
community (governments, national federations, and national olympic 
committees), it may be able to apply adequate pressure and backing to force 
FIFA and the IOC into cleaning up their organizations and proving they are 
run without outside and improper influences. However, this is dependent on 
the International Community joining together, and sporting disputes are 
rarely the main concerns of world leaders.  
The decisions of the CAS are only enforceable because international 
sporting organizations have submitted to its use. Even though the Federal 
Swiss Tribunal has ruled that the CAS is independent of IFs and the IOC, 
the CAS would cease to exist without the submission of these organizations 
to its authority. Therefore, although the CAS may be structurally 
independent, its existence is entirely dependent and consequently checked 
by IFs and the IOC. The CAS cannot be seen as a tribunal that does not 
have an interest in the proceedings that come before it.  
There does not seem to be an easy fix to problems facing the 
international sporting community. The global problems affected by the legal 
interactions between FIFA, the IOC, and the CAS are not a matter of life 
and death. Consequently, they will not necessarily get nor deserve the 
attention of our global leaders. We may be stuck with the system that we 
have and forced to rely on public pressure and private investigations to 
expose improper actions taken by these organizations.  
The best hope for reform is for the media to keep shining light on these 
organizations and for national federations to band together and stand up for 
themselves. The British have appeared to be the leaders in both of these 
instances. The British media is responsible for bringing many of the most 
recent facts to the public, and England has even discussed leaving FIFA, 
though it has since decided against it.202 Though leaving FIFA may be an 
extreme and unreasonable solution, organizing National Federations and 
National Olympic Committees may be the best way to create genuine 
change and purify the host site selection process. Without the support of 
national bodies, their international counterparts will lose all importance.  
It is not unprecedented for parties involved in highly publicized 
international competition to participate in such collective action. The fight 
against doping in sport has required collective action from a variety of 
interested parties.203 Although this is more of an example of the IFs from 
different sports banding to together to create a common body,204 it serves as 
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proof that federations can work together toward reaching a goal or, as in this 
case, eliminating a problem from their sport. This has been an efficient 
method of solving issues in the past and could effectively be called upon 
again.  
The latest corruption scandal in FIFA may also have served as a turning 
point for the Swiss legislature. There is currently an initiative sponsored by 
Carlo Sommaruga, a Geneva-based lawmaker and member of the Swiss 
Socialist Party, which will make bribery of individuals a criminal offense.205 
However, it remains to be seen whether both houses in the Swiss Parliament 
view this as a significant problem.206 Under Swiss law,207 prosecutors have 
no legal authority to investigate bribery in sporting organizations.208 This 
gives these organizations the freedom to operate as they wish and may even 
be a contributing factor in the selection of Switzerland as a headquarters.  
CONCLUSION  
 Selecting hosts for the FIFA World Cup and the Olympics is an important 
and competitive process. However, like the competition within the field of 
play, it is important that the spirit of international competition be 
exemplified throughout the selection process. It may not always be possible 
to count on an international sports law system to protect the interests of all 
parties. In addition to the media’s role of shining the spotlight on 
organizations such as the IOC and FIFA, it is imperative for participants and 
national organizations to stand up for themselves. These are the groups that 
make up international sports and should be able to hold their representative 
International Federations accountable for their actions. Also, it seems that 
those that host these organizations are beginning to get tired of being taken 
advantage of and may also begin to hold international sporting 
organizations accountable for their actions. Ultimately, there does not 
appear to be one single solution to the problem at hand, but maximizing 
transparency and not blindly following International Federations will create 
the fairest host site selection process.  
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